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THE EVOLUTION OF YOUTH AS AN EXCUSE: STRIKING A 
BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTEREST OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT KIDS ARE KIDS 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
 APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
In re Jaquan M.1 
(decided July 3, 2012) 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Jaquan M., a fourteen year old, was tried in a family court ju-
venile proceeding for the adult crime equivalent of possession of a 
weapon in the second degree.2  At approximately 9:30 p.m., police 
officers patrolling “in a drug-prone location” observed Jaquan walk-
ing down the sidewalk with a backpack.3  He then veered off the 
sidewalk between two parked cars, and looked both ways up and 
down the road.4  Back on the sidewalk, Jaquan looked up and down 
once again, and paced in a circle.5  He then made a thirty-second 
cellphone call, and continued pacing and looking around.6  While 
kneeling between the parked cars, Jaquan cautiously removed a white 
object from his waistband and placed it in the side pocket of his 
backpack.7  Despite officers’ admissions that the white object looked 
nothing like a gun, the officers believed the object could have been a 
firearm because Jaquan handled the object in such a careful manner 
and had removed it from “the most common location for carrying a 
gun.”8 
 
1 948 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012). 
2 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
8 Id. 
1
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Following their observations, one police officer approached 
Jaquan, noticed his backpack appeared bottom-heavy, identified him-
self, and told Jaquan to walk with him.9  Jaquan then indicated he 
was fourteen years old by stating, “What do you want from me?  I am 
only fourteen [years old].”10  While the second officer approached, 
the first officer frisked Jaquan and asked about his comings and go-
ings.11  Jaquan quickly answered that he was coming from a relative’s 
house.12  But, as to where he was going, he pointed out an address 
written in pen on his arm, and said, “Here.”13  This address was 
known to police as being in “a high crime, drug-prone” area.14 
Officers smelled marihuana, and inquired about the contents 
of the backpack twice.15  In both instances, Jaquan countered by stat-
ing that nothing was in the backpack.16  Upon the officers’ inquiry 
regarding Jaquan’s identification, Jaquan provided only a first name 
and birthdate, but did not provide any other form of identification.17  
Jaquan then gave police permission to check the contents of his 
backpack for school papers, as he suggested that he might have some 
papers bearing his full name.18  The officers found nothing inside the 
main compartment, but upon searching the side pocket, they found a 
heavy white bag.19  Considering Jaquan to be a flight risk at that 
point, the officers handcuffed him, opened the white bag to find a 
loaded handgun and rounds of ammunition, and discovered $963.00 
in cash in Jaquan’s pocket.20 
Following a fact-finding hearing, the family court judge de-
nied Jaquan’s motion to suppress the gun.21  The judge concluded 
that the police were justified in their search of the backpack based on 
the totality of their observations including: Jaquan’s furtive behavior 
in a high-crime area at night, inability to supply his full name to the 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 52-53. 
12 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
2
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officers, and his backpack’s heavy appearance.22  As a result of the 
denied suppression motion, Jaquan admitted to committing the act 
that would have been a crime of possession of a weapon had he been 
sixteen years old.23  Consequently, he was adjudicated a juvenile de-
linquent and placed on fifteen months of enhanced supervision proba-
tion.24  The family court judge further directed Jaquan “to obey his 
parents, attend school regularly, refrain from the use of drugs or al-
cohol, complete 60 hours of community service and [refrain from 
any] gang affiliation or further difficulties at home or in the commu-
nity.”25 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, relying on People v. De Bour,26 reversed the 
family court’s decision, granted the motion to suppress the weapon, 
vacated the disposition, and dismissed the case.27  In De Bour, the 
court categorized four common police actions:28 (1) the approach in 
order to request information; (2) the common-law right to inquire; (3) 
the stop and frisk, or “forcible stop and detention;”29 and (4) the ar-
rest.30  In order to justify an approach, police must have “some objec-
tive credible reason” for the approach.31  To take the next step and 
inquire, police must establish a “founded suspicion that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot.”32  A forcible stop and detention is legally justified 
when based on a reasonable suspicion that a crime occurred, is occur-
ring, or is about to occur.33  Lastly, an arrest must be founded on 
“probable cause to believe” that a crime was committed.34  Thus, the 
justification for a certain level of intrusion by police is directly corre-
lated to the objective credibility of their belief as determined by their 
observations and knowledge during the situation in question.35 
 
22 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53. 
23 Id.; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
265.03 (McKinney 2006). 
24 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53. 
25 Id. at 53-54. 
26 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 
27 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52, 54. 
28 Id. at 54 (citing De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72). 
29 Id. (quoting De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572). 
30 Id. 
31 Id.; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72. 
32 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. 
33  Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. 
34  Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. 
35 De Bour, 386 N.E.2d at 572. 
3
Hughes: The Evolution of Youth as an Excuse
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
970 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
The court in Jaquan concluded that the police were only justi-
fied in the first two De Bour actions—the approach and inquiry.36  
Based on Jaquan’s apparently surreptitious behavior in a known 
crime-ridden area at night, the police reasonably formed the requisite 
founded suspicion that Jaquan “was engaged in criminal activity.”37  
However, as to the search of the backpack beyond the main com-
partment and Jaquan’s arrest, the police did not possess the requisite 
reasonable suspicion, or “quantum knowledge sufficient to induce an 
ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to be-
lieve that criminal activity is at hand.”38 
Based on its curious reasonable suspicion analysis, as well as 
its consent analysis, the majority in Jaquan seems to have first con-
cluded that this particular fourteen year old first-time-offender did 
not deserve a record, and then analyzed the facts to specifically sup-
press the gun.  The majority reasoned that each police observation of 
Jaquan’s behavior, when analyzed independently from the others, 
was susceptible to an innocent alternative validation, and therefore 
the police did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion.39  How-
ever, in the dissenting opinion, Justice Catterson proposed that the 
majority incorrectly analyzed each pertinent police observation sepa-
rately, knocking each down as insufficient by itself to support a rea-
sonable suspicion.40 
Instead of this piecemeal approach, the majority should have 
applied a totality of the circumstances analysis and viewed the situa-
tion “as a progression of actions, with each circumstance increasing 
the level of the police officer’s suspicion.”41  For instance, the majori-
ty emphasized the police officers’ concessions that the white “object 
bore no obvious hallmarks of a [gun].”42  Relying on People v. Craw-
ford 43 and People v. Fernandez,44 the majority reasoned that a simple 
 
36 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
37 Id.; see id. at 54, 55 (denouncing the frisk as unreasonable because the officers admitted 
the gun looked nothing like a gun and they did not feel their lives were in danger). 
38 Id. (quoting People v. Sobotker, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (N.Y. 1978)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
39 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (Catterson, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (citing People v. Rodriquez, 895 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2010) (find-
ing reasonable suspicion where defendant behaved stealthily, in a high crime and drug distri-
bution location and his waistband appeared weighed down)). 
42 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (majority opinion). 
43 931 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011) (finding no reasonable suspicion to 
seize defendant when he fled police officers with a bulge in his pocket). 
4
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action of holding an object near one’s waistband, or presence of a 
bulge in a pocket, without any precise visible factor(s) indicating a 
gun—such as an outline in the shape of a gun—is not enough to rea-
sonably conclude the suspect is in possession of a gun.45  Neverthe-
less, the majority disregarded the valid possibility that other factors 
gave the officers reason to suspect that Jaquan carried a gun or other 
dangerous weapon.46  In fact, Justice Catterson pointed out that the 
bulge was no longer merely a bulge when the police observed Jaquan 
pull the white object, which was about the size of a gun, from out of 
his waistband, handling the object with care.47  Furthermore, Justice 
Catterson explained that there “were other ‘indicia of criminality,’ ”  
that the majority failed to recognize as a possible justification for the 
police officer’s reasonable suspicion48 such as, the suspicious nature 
of the address written on Jaquan’s arm49  Thus, where in reality, the 
record reflected that the police made several other legitimate observa-
tions that would have led a reasonable person to believe Jaquan was 
in possession of a gun,50 the majority seems to have cherry picked 
certain facts to satisfy their specific sought after end—a clean slate 
for a fourteen year old boy. 
Regarding consent to search Jaquan’s backpack, the Appellate 
Division concluded that Jaquan did not voluntarily consent to a 
search of his entire bag.51  Purportedly, Jaquan possessed a reasona-
ble expectation that the scope of the search would be limited to a 
 
44 928 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011) (concluding no reasonable suspicion 
to stop and frisk defendant based only on the fact that his hand was near his waistband and 
defendant was observed in a high crime area) (citing People v. Sierra, 638 N.E.2d 955, 956 
(N.Y. 1994) (lacking reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant after he grabbed at his waist-
band and fled)); see also People v. Powell, 667 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
1998) (reasoning that defendant’s location in a high crime area as the sole indicia of crimi-
nality was not sufficient to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and 
frisk). 
45 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54, 55 (“Certainly the dissent would argue that any person on 
the street, even in a high-crime area, is presumed to be carrying a weapon based only on a 
drooping pocket or backpack.”). 
46 Id. at 56 (Catterson, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 57 (citing People v. Alozo, 580 N.Y.S.2d 298, 298-99 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
1992)). 
48 Id. 
49 See generally id. at 52-56 (majority opinion). 
50 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (Catterson, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 56 (majority opinion) (citing People v. Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (concluding lack of voluntary consent to a search of the interior of ve-
hicle where it was late at night, inquiries by police were unreasonably accusatory in nature, 
and the officer did not inform defendant that he could refuse the search request)). 
5
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mere search for identification papers.52  Thus, “[w]hen the officer 
opened a separate compartment in the backpack that contained no pa-
pers, the right to proceed [extinguished].”53 
However, Justice Catterson rejected this argument—that 
Jaquan’s invitation to search was limited to the main compartment of 
his backpack—as unpersuasive.54  Instead, the dissent reasoned that 
“[t]he scope of a search is ‘generally defined by its expressed object’ 
and the ‘reasonable’ expectation of the person consenting to the 
search.”55  Furthermore, because school papers with an individual’s 
name could reasonably be expected to be located in “any pocket of a 
student’s backpack,” Justice Catterson argued that Jaquan, by inviting 
the police to look inside for identifying papers, actually consented to 
the search of his entire backpack.56 
Another curious aspect of the court’s decision in Jaquan was 
that in determining whether Jaquan voluntarily consented to the 
backpack search, the court relied primarily on two cases involving 
vehicle searches, as opposed to baggage searches.57  The two cases 
relied on were People v. Barreras58 and People v. Gomez.59  In 
Barreras, the defendant was stopped for allegedly driving through a 
stop sign without stopping.60  After police found a gun and drugs in 
his vehicle,61 Barreras was ultimately convicted of criminal posses-
sion of a weapon, as well as several charges of possession of a con-
trolled substance in varying degrees.62  After pulling Barreras over, 
the officer asked for identification papers.63  While responding to the 
officer’s questions, Barreras failed to make eye contact with the of-
 
52 Id. (citing People v. Gomez, 838 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (N.Y. 2005) (finding lack of con-
sent where the scope of a vehicle search went beyond the reasonable expectation when offic-
ers damaged the vehicle by removing attached carpet and used a crow bar to alter sheet met-
al)). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 58 (Catterson, J., dissenting). 
55 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (quoting Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 56 (majority opinion). 
58 677 N.Y.S.2d 526 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998). 
59 838 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 2005), remitted to 808 N.Y.S.2d 626 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 
2005). 
60 Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 527. 
63 Id. at 528. 
6
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ficer.64  Additionally, while Barreras retrieved his license and regis-
tration and handed it over to the officer, his hands trembled.65  The 
officer also noted that the “defendant’s nervousness was unusual” 
considering he was able to produce the required paperwork.66  The 
officer followed up with more questioning, and asked whether “de-
fendant had ‘a machine gun, or a hand grenade, or a rocket launcher’ 
in the car.”67  Barreras replied negatively, but the reply was not the 
jovial response the officer expected to a relatively outlandish, un-
founded question.68  Consequently, although at that point the officer 
did not “fear for his life,” the officer’s suspicions that Barreras was in 
possession of a weapon were further raised.69  The officer then asked 
Barreras whether “he would ‘mind’ if the officer looked through the 
car.”70  Barreras, while still avoiding eye contact, replied, “Okay.”71  
Then, the officer asked if he could search the entire car, and Barreras 
responded, “[Y]eah, it’s all right.”72 
Upon a cursory inspection of the car with a flashlight, the of-
ficer saw “nothing that could ‘hurt’ him,” but continued his search by 
looking in the center console.73  The officer noticed that the lining of 
the console was loose and removed it.74  Underneath the lining, a 
handgun rested on a large, clear plastic bag filled with smaller bag-
gies of cocaine and marihuana.75 
At trial, Barreras moved to suppress the handgun and the 
drugs.76  The trial court determined “that the totality of the circum-
stances indicated that ‘[Barreras’] act of consent [to search his car] 
was voluntary,’ ” and consequently denied Barreras’ motion to sup-
press the gun and packages of cocaine and marihuana.77  However, 
the Appellate Division, First Department reversed the trial court’s de-
 
64 Id. 
65 Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 529. 
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cision and granted the motion to suppress the physical evidence.78  
The court in Barreras reasoned that “the request to search cannot be 
analyzed in a vacuum and the length and circumstances of the con-
tinued detention must be considered.”79  Further, the court explained 
that, “[f]or a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer’s 
action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the 
seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to 
the circumstances which justified the detention in the first in-
stance.”80  Upon learning that Barreras’ papers were in order, the of-
ficer no longer had justification to detain Barreras.81  Without further 
indication of wrongdoing, the officers were obligated to issue a 
summons, “and allow [Barreras] to resume his journey.”82  Thus, the 
fact that Barreras failed to make eye contact, was extremely nervous, 
and responded to the officer with innocuous discrepancies, did not 
provide the officer with “a basis for further suspicion.”83 
Furthermore, the court in Barreras reasoned that the officer’s 
questioning went beyond simple requests for information and rose to 
the level of a common-law inquiry—requiring “support[] by a found-
ed suspicion that criminality [was] afoot.”84  Because the officer was 
not justified in detaining Barreras, the officer was likewise not justi-
fied in seeking consent.85  Nevertheless, the court observed that even 
if the officer had justification to request consent to search, Barreras 
did not consent voluntarily, and thus, the consent was not valid.86  
The court explained that proving voluntariness of consent is a heavy 
burden for the People to meet.87  That is, consent is only voluntary if 
it is an “unequivocal product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice.”88  Observing the circumstances surrounding the officer’s en-
 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 530. 
80 Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 530 (quoting People v. Banks, 650 N.E.2d 833, 835 (N.Y. 
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (quoting People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
85 Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 530. 
86 Id. at 531. 
87 Id. at 530. 
88 Id. (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976) (“Consent to search 
is voluntary when it is a true act of the will, an unequivocal product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice.”).  
8
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counter with Barreras, specifically that it was late at night, the police 
pointed a flashlight at Barreras, and asked him specific and accu-
satory questions, the court found that Barreras had not consented vol-
untarily.89 
In Gomez, although the defendant’s consent to search his ve-
hicle was voluntary, the court determined the search exceeded the 
scope of the consent given.90  Gomez was pulled over by a police of-
ficer because the windows of his car were darkly tinted in violation of 
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 375.12-a.(b)(2).91  When 
the officer approached Gomez’s car, he first looked through the tinted 
passenger window, and then examined the undercarriage of the car, 
as was his routine as a narcotics investigator.92  The undercarriage 
had a fresh undercoat surrounding the gas tank—“a telltale sign[] of 
[a] secret compartment[].”93  Gomez also produced a registration card 
that seemed to have been altered.94  The tinted windows, the alleged 
secret compartment, and the tampered registration card led the officer 
to suspect that Gomez’s car had been used for drug transportation.95  
Therefore, the officer asked Gomez whether he had any type of con-
traband in the car.96  Gomez replied, “No.”97  Then, the officer re-
quested consent to search the vehicle, which Gomez provided.98  Up-
on obtaining consent, the officer ordered Gomez and his passengers 
out of the car.99  Immediately, an officer moved back the seat above 
the suspicious part of the undercarriage, viewed what looked like a 
 
89 Id. at 531 (citing Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 211) (finding that consent was not voluntary 
when it “was a product of improper police inquiry”); see also Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580 
(“No one circumstance is determinative of the voluntariness of consent.  Whether consent 
has been voluntarily given or is only a yielding to overbearing official pressure must be de-
termined from the circumstances.”). 
90 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272. 
91 Id.; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375.12-a.(b)(2) (McKinney 2012) (“No person shall 
operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway, road or street: the sidewings or side 
windows of which on either side forward of or adjacent to the operator’s seat are composed 
of, covered by or treated with any material which has a light transmittance of less than sev-
enty percent.”). 
92 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
9
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brand new carpet, and removed the carpet.100  Under the carpet was a 
cut in the floor that the officer attempted to open further with his 
pocket knife.101  The same officer then retrieved a crow bar, pried 
open the gas tank, and recovered one and a half pounds of cocaine.102  
Gomez was then arrested and issued a summons for the tinted win-
dows and an expired inspection.103  Ultimately, Gomez was charged 
with, among other things, criminal possession of a controlled sub-
stance.104  Subsequently, Gomez claimed lack of voluntary consent to 
the search, and alternatively that the scope of the search exceeded the 
scope of consent.105  The trial court denied the motion on both 
grounds because Gomez “never expressly limited or revoked his 
permission” and “in the absence of consent, probable cause existed to 
justify the search.”106 
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed 
that the consent was voluntary, reasoning that the search “did not ex-
ceed the scope of [Gomez’s] consent [when Gomez] ‘fail[ed] to place 
any limitations on the search, and [failed] to object to the search as it 
was conducted.’ ”107  However, the New York Court of Appeals sub-
sequently reversed, finding that the officer received general consent, 
but that the search went beyond the scope of the consent given.108  
Relying on a Second Circuit interpretation of consent, the Court of 
Appeals reiterated that “an individual who consents to a search of his 
car should reasonably expect that readily-opened containers discov-
ered inside the car will be opened and examined.”109  Further, the 
court determined that general consent to search an object, by itself is 
not sufficient to “justify a search that impairs the structural integrity 
of a vehicle,” and therefore, the officer should have obtained specific 
consent to justify the forced opening of the floorboards of the car and 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1272-73. 
106 Id. at 1273. 
107 Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273 (quoting People v. Gomez, 782 N.Y.S.2d 744, 744 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 2004)). 
108 Id. at 1274. 
109 Id. at 1273 (quoting United States v. Snow, 44 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1995) (reasoning 
that the search did not exceed the scope of consent when the officer opened a duffle bag 
found in the back seat of a car and another bag under the back seat) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
10
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damaging the gas tank.110 
Here, as mentioned above, Jaquan is distinguishable from 
Barreras and Gomez because the object in question in Jaquan was a 
student’s backpack, not a vehicle, and the search did not exceed the 
scope of Jaquan’s consent.111  First, in Jaquan, the police did not ask 
questions, like in Barreras, that rose to the level of being accusatory 
in nature.112  Nor did the police in Jaquan shine flashlights in 
Jaquan’s face or intentionally intimidate him prior to receiving his 
consent to the requested search.113  Additionally, as opposed to 
Gomez, where the police damaged the vehicle, in Jaquan the back-
pack was left intact.114 
Ultimately, whether one agrees with the decision in Jaquan or 
not, Jaquan was granted a clean slate.115  Perhaps the court was sym-
pathetic towards Jaquan because he was fourteen, just as the United 
States Supreme Court was sympathetic to the fourteen year olds in 
Miller v. Alabama,116 which was decided less than a month prior to 
Jaquan.117  Additionally, although implied here, the disposition in 
Jaquan seems to reflect a growing trend throughout the country, as 
well as in New York State, recognizing the significant differences be-
tween children and adults that affect levels of criminal culpability.118  
Nevertheless, in reversing the disposition, the Appellate Division ap-
peared to have engaged in significant legal gymnastics in order to 
achieve a certain result. 
The overarching issue remains: At what age should a person 
be considered an adult in the eyes of the law?  This case note will ad-
 
110 Id. at 1273-74. 
111 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (Catterson, J., dissenting). 
112 Compare Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53 (asking defendant pedigree information) (ma-
jority opinion), with Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (asking whether defendant had illegal 
contraband in his car). 
113 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d 51; Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 529. 
114 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53; Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273-74. 
115 Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
116 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (establishing that mandatory sentences of life without parole 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment of fourteen year old juveniles). 
117 See Prof. Richard Klein, Presenter, 24th Annual Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court Review 
at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center Department of Continuing Legal Educa-
tion (Oct. 26, 2012) (explaining that the Court granted certiorari to defendants in Miller be-
cause people tend to be more sympathetic to fourteen year olds as opposed to sixteen or sev-
enteen year olds). 
118 See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (determining that in light of 
recent proliferation of psychological studies of adolescents, it is no longer constitutional for 
states to subject juveniles to mandatory life sentences without parole). 
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dress some procedural differences between juvenile proceedings and 
adult criminal proceedings, analyze the evolution of federal precedent 
regarding juvenile culpability, and discuss the proposed litigation in 
New York State that, if passed will increase the age of culpability in 
the State. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
JUVENILES UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
A basic understanding of juvenile treatment under federal law 
may help to explain the underpinnings of the decision in Jaquan.  As 
policy-makers and the judiciary have historically observed, children 
should not be held to the same standard of culpability as adults.119 
Yet, medicine, science, and legal theories continue to evolve in order 
to reflect societal norms and other relevant policy concerns. Thus, 
finding an appropriate balance between these competing interests—
seeking to safeguard juveniles’ constitutional protections while hold-
ing them to a lesser standard of culpability has proven a difficult task 
for the legislature, as well as the courts. 
A.  The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
Following the proliferation of separate juvenile justice sys-
tems on the state level, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
(“FJDA”) was enacted in 1938.120  The FJDA was designed to protect 
youths from the “consequences of a criminal conviction.”121  It also 
recognized the possible benefits of rehabilitation and treatment as an 
alternative to punishment.122  One provision in the Act permitted fed-
eral prosecutors to offer any defendant under the age of eighteen to 
be prosecuted as a juvenile in a federal district court, contingent upon 
the juvenile’s acceptance of the special prosecution in writing.123  
However, following several Supreme Court decisions regarding juve-
niles, discussed in the following sections, the FJDA was amended by 
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 
 
119 Tina Chen, Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: Why is it a Fundamental 
Right for Adults and Not for Juveniles?, 28 J. JUV. L. 1, 1 (2007). 
120 Id. 
121 United States v. Torres, 500 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1974). 
122 Id. 
123 D. Ross Martin, Note, Conspiratorial Children? The Intersection of the Federal Juve-
nile Delinquency Act and Federal Conspiracy Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (1994). 
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(“JJDPA”).124  The JJDPA provided funding to state juvenile justice 
programs to reduce and prevent juvenile delinquency.125  It also “re-
structured the federal juvenile court system . . . by incorporating pro-
visions borrowed from model acts and state statutory reform,” and al-
tered the FJDA in four major ways.126  First, the definition of a 
juvenile under federal law changed from any person under the age of 
eighteen at the time of indictment, to any person below the age of 
twenty-one who has committed an offense before reaching the age of 
eighteen.127  Second, the JJPDA “required judicial approval before 
trying any juvenile as an adult.”128  Third, the offenses for which a 
juvenile could be prosecuted as an adult were limited.129  Fourth, the 
JJPDA permitted federal prosecution of juveniles only in instances 
where a state refused to prosecute the offense.130  In 1984, the FJDA 
was again substantially modified by the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act.131  In what was thought of as an adequate response to violent 
juvenile conduct, the amendment added provisions that required the 
transfer of juveniles over sixteen, who were charged with certain vio-
lent felonies or serious narcotics offenses, to criminal prosecution in 
federal district court. 132 
Even before all its modifications, the FJDA was revolutionary 
in establishing a process through which juvenile crimes could be ad-
judicated that differed from that of adult criminal proceedings.133  As 
opposed to New York State law, which currently has the general age 
of culpability and subsequent prosecution in adult criminal court set 
at sixteen,134 the FJDA originally set the age of culpability at eight-
 
124 Id. at 861 n.15 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 
(1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)); see Williams S. Sessions & Fay M. 
Bracey, A Synopsis of the Federal Juvevnile Delinquency Act, 14 ST. MARY’S L.J. 509, 509 
(1983) (providing a general historical summary of the FJDA prior to the 1984 amendments). 
125 Justice Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas—It’s a Crime! Or Should Be, 
51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 26-27 (1999). 
126 Martin, supra note 123, at 861. 
127 Id. at 862. 
128 Id.at 861. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Martin, supra note 123, at 862. 
132 Id. at 861-62, 865-66 (citations omitted). 
133 Torres, 500 F.2d at 949. 
134 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20.42 (McKinney 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) 
(McKinney 2010). 
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een.135  Furthermore, since the passage of the FJDA, age eighteen has 
remained the general age of culpability for violations of federal 
law.136 
B.  Due Process Rights of Juveniles 
Despite its many amendments and attempts to uniformly pro-
vide fairness in juvenile proceedings, the FJDA did not encode all 
due process rights normally afforded adults to juveniles involved in 
federal adjudication procedures.137  For example, as discussed later in 
this section, the Sixth Amendment usually affords adult defendants 
found in violation of federal law the right to a trial by jury; however, 
juveniles who are adjudicated in federal district court do not share the 
same guarantees afforded under this right.138 
There are two key justifications for the variation of rights af-
forded to adults and juveniles.  The first is that juveniles, whether 
charged and tried in federal or state court, are “proceeded against by 
information.”139 The second rationale is that even where the conduct 
underlying a charge is criminal in nature, the procedure and resolu-
tion of juvenile delinquency proceedings are considered a hybrid of 
civil and criminal proceedings.140 
Twenty years after the FJDA, but prior to any of its major 
amendments, in the Application of Gault,141 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that notwithstanding the differences between 
adult and juvenile adjudication, “[t]he Court has consistently made 
plain that adequate and timely notice is the fulcrum of due process, 
whatever the purposes of the proceeding.”142  The Court explained 
that while the states have the inherent authority and discretion to im-
plement policy that differs from that which is afforded at the federal 
level, one’s right to receive notice of the charges raised against him 
or her is  “[s]o fundamental a protection [that it cannot] be spared 
here nor left to the ‘favor or grace’ of state authorities.”143  The Court 
 
135 Kinkeade, supra note 125, at 26; Sessions & Bracey, supra note 124, at 516. 
136 See 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2006). 
137 McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971); Chen, supra note 119, at 1-2. 
138 McKiever, 403 U.S. at 547; Chen, supra note 119, at 1-2. 
139 Torres, 500 F.2d at 945. 
140 McKiever, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (citations omitted). 
141 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
142 Id. at 73. 
143 Id. (quoting Central of Georgia R.R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127, 138 (1907)).  
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explained that in specific situations where a child’s liberty is at stake, 
meaning there is a possibility that he or she “may be committed to a 
state institution . . . the Due Process Clause has a role to play.”144 
In Gault, fifteen-year old Gerald Gault, who was presently on 
a term of probation, was committed to a juvenile detention center in 
Arizona for six years after he made a lewd phone call to a woman.145  
An adult, age eighteen years or older, committing the same crime 
would have received a maximum punishment of “a fine of $5 or $50, 
or imprisonment” of up to two months.146  At the time Gerald was 
picked up by an officer for the phone call, his parents were both at 
work.147  The police officers failed to inform Mr. and Mrs. Gault that 
their son had been arrested and “taken to [a] Children’s Detention 
Home.”148  Consequently, when Mrs. Gault arrived home from work, 
she sent her other son to look for Gerald.149  The brother somehow 
learned where Gerald had been taken and arrested, and told his moth-
er.150  Only upon speaking with the arresting officer by going to the 
“detention home” did Mrs. Gault find out “why Jerry was there.”151  
The officer also informed Mrs. Gault at the Detention Home that 
Gerald’s first hearing would be the next day.152 
In accordance with the Arizona Juvenile Code at the time, the 
arresting officer filed a general petition that failed to provide specific 
facts, but alleged that Gerald was a neglected and delinquent child.153 
Also in accordance with the then-existing Arizona Code, the petition 
was filed in the court, but never served upon Gerald or his parents.154  
At the initial hearing on June 9, 1964, the Gaults made their appear-
ances.155  However, the woman who allegedly received the lewd 
phone calls (the complainant) did not attend that hearing or any sub-
sequent hearings and never spoke with the judge.156  Furthermore, the 
 
144 Id. at 13. 
145 Id. at 4. 
146 Gault, 387 U.S. at 29. 
147 Id at 5. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Gault, 387 U.S. at 5. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 31-32. 
154 Id. at 32. 
155 Id. 
156 Gault, 387 U.S. at 5, 7. 
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hearing was neither recorded and transcribed, nor documented in a 
“memorandum or record [reflecting] the substance of the proceed-
ings.”157  The judge questioned Gerald about the phone calls and Ger-
ald apparently “admitted [to] making one of the lewd statements.”158  
At the end of the hearing, despite the judge’s adjournment of the pro-
ceedings by saying, “he would ‘think about it,’ ” Gerald was returned 
to the Detention Home instead of to his parents.159  After being de-
tained for approximately three or four days, Gerald was finally sent 
home with a handwritten note from the arresting officer informing 
Mrs. Gault of the date and time of a second delinquency hearing.160  
At this second hearing, the judge adjudicated Gerald a juvenile delin-
quent and committed him to the State Industrial School until he 
turned twenty-one.161 
At the time, Arizona law prevented Gerald from appealing the 
juvenile court disposition to a higher court.162  Therefore, the Gaults 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of 
Arizona, which was referred to the Superior Court.163  The Superior 
Court dismissed the writ.164  On review, the Arizona Supreme Court 
affirmed dismissal of the writ.165 
The Gaults appealed to the United States Supreme Court, ar-
guing that the Juvenile Code of Arizona violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it lacked procedural 
safeguards and gave “the Juvenile Court virtually unlimited discre-
tion.”166  The Gaults further argued that the Arizona Code denied ju-
veniles six basic rights: “1. Notice of charges; 2. Rights to counsel; 3. 
Right to confrontation and cross-examination; 4. Privilege against 
self-incrimination; 5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings; and 6. 
Right to appellate review.”167 
In Gault, the United States Supreme Court relied on three of 
its previous decisions that touched upon constitutional questions of 
 
157 Id. at 5. 
158 Id. at 6. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Gault, 387 U.S. at 7. 
162 Id. at 8. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 9. 
165 Id.at 10. 
166 Gault, 387 U.S. at 10. 
167 Id. 
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due process as applied to various specific stages of state juvenile pro-
ceedings.168  The three cases included Haley v. Ohio,169 Gallegos v. 
Colorado,170 and Kent v. United States.171  Haley and Gallegos both 
involved the admissibility of confessions by juveniles and determined 
that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the due process protec-
tion against the admissibility of coerced confessions by juveniles.172 
In Kent, a juvenile challenged the constitutionality of a court’s 
failure to provide a hearing to decide whether he should be tried in 
adult criminal court.173  The Court in Kent “emphasized the necessity 
that ‘the basic requirements of due process and fairness’ [b]e satisfied 
in [hearings determining whether to waive a juvenile to adult criminal 
court].”174  Additionally, the Court in Kent outlined that the 
objectives [of the juvenile court system] are to provide 
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child 
and protection for society, not to fix criminal respon-
sibility, guilt and punishment.  The State is parens 
patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.  
But the admonition to function in a “parental” rela-
tionship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrari-
ness.175 
Relying on the above general principles, observing that all 
persons, including those under eighteen should enjoy protections 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, the Court in Gault determined 
that juveniles have a right to notice of charges,176 to counsel,177 to 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.178  In fact, the Court, in its analysis of 
the Arizona Code, lauded the New York Family Court Act as an ex-
ample of a statute that successfully included procedural due process 
guarantees to juveniles, such as the right to counsel and protection 
 
168 Id. at 12-13. 
169 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
170 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
171 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
172 Gault, 387 U.S. at 12-13. 
173 Id. at 12. 
174 Id. at 12 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 553). 
175 Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-55. 
176 Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-34. 
177 Id. at 42. 
178 Id. at 57. 
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against self-incrimination.179  However, the Court also called into 
question the merits of a separate juvenile justice system—citing sta-
tistical studies representing a failure to deter recidivism and rehabili-
tate juveniles.180  In turn, the Court explained that should juveniles 
remain adjudicated separately from adults, a juvenile court’s well in-
tentioned model of parens patriae must not overshadow constitution-
al guarantees, opining that: 
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that 
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, 
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and proce-
dure . . . The absence of substantive standards has not 
necessarily meant that children receive careful, com-
passionate, individualized treatment. The absence of 
procedural rules based upon constitutional principle 
has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective 
procedures. Departures from established principles of 
due process have frequently resulted not in enlight-
ened procedure, but in arbitrariness . . . Due process of 
law is the primary and indispensable foundation of in-
dividual freedom . . . [T]he observance of due process 
standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly adminis-
tered, will not compel the States to abandon or dis-
place any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile 
process.181 
Keeping in mind this underlying concept, the Court in Gault estab-
lished that in order to comply with the Constitution, state law must 
acknowledge that children, much like adults, have a right to timely 
notice of charges,182 a right to counsel,183 a right to confrontation and 
cross-examination,184 and a right to invoke the privilege against self-
 
179 Id. at 40-41, 48 (“In New York . . . the recently enacted Family Court Act provides that 
the juvenile and his parents must be advised at the start of the hearing of his right to remain 
silent . . . police must [also] attempt to communicate with . . . parents before questioning [a 
juvenile], and that absent ‘special circumstances’ a confession may not be obtained from a 
child prior to notifying his parents or relatives and releasing the child either to them or to the 
Family Court.”). 
180 Id. at 21-22. 
181 Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-21. 
182 Id. at 33-34. 
183 Id. at 41. 
184 Id. at 57. 
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incrimination.185  Furthermore, although the Court did not touch upon 
other rights such as appellate review, it reversed the Supreme Court 
of Arizona and remanded Gerald Gault’s case for further proceedings 
in juvenile court consistent with Gault.186  Thus, the Court in Gault 
recognized that safeguarding children’s due process rights would ac-
tually aid children, rejecting the notion that affording those rights 
could negatively affect the questionable benefits provided by the ju-
venile court parens patriae approach.187 
C.  Right to Trial by Jury 
In the wake of Gault, courts became more accepting of the 
benefits of affording limited due process rights to children, while also 
becoming more cognizant of the potential for success in state juvenile 
justice systems.188  Furthermore, following Gault, the Supreme Court 
affirmed other fundamental rights of juveniles, such as the right to the 
standard of proof of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt.189  
However, in McKiever v. Pennsylvania,190 the Court determined that 
the fundamental right to trial by jury in state court afforded to adults 
was not necessarily fundamental to children in state juvenile courts 
because entitling children to a jury trial could infringe upon the 
unique, rehabilitative goals of those courts.191  Refraining from con-
clusively labeling juvenile court proceedings as either “criminal” or 
“civil,” the Court reasoned that requiring a jury trial “as a matter of 
constitutional precept . . . [would] remake the juvenile proceeding in-
to a fully adversary process and . . . put an effective end to . . . the 
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.”192  
Relying on statistical studies, the Court assessed the “juvenile con-
 
185 Id. at 55; see Gault, 387 U.S. at 47 (observing that the Fifth Amendment, by its express 
language is an “unequivocal protection [] without exception”, the Court commented that “[i]t 
would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hard-
ened criminals but not to children”). 
186 Id. at 59. 
187 Id. at 21. 
188 See, e.g., Mckiever, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366; United States 
v. Torres, 500 F.2d 944 (1974). 
189 Winship, 397 U.S. at 368. 
190 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
191 Mckiever, 403 U.S. at 540 (indicating that the “addition of the trial by jury ‘might well 
destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings.’ ” (quoting In re Terry, 265 A.2d 
350, 355 (Pa. 1970))). 
192 Id. at 541, 545. 
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cept” as a “disappointment[] of grave dimensions”  because it failed 
to deliver on its promised rehabilitative goals.193  Additionally, the 
Court recognized that a separate juvenile system fails because its suc-
cess “depends on the availability of resources, on the interest and 
commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on under-
standing as to cause and effect and cure.”194  Nevertheless, the Court 
reasoned that in the unique field of creating a special court to rehabil-
itate children and prevent recidivism, experimentation is the key to 
success, and “imposing the jury trial” would impede upon that exper-
imentation.195  In declining to declare a fundamental right to a jury 
trial for juveniles, the Court left room for the States to decide whether 
to embrace such a right.196  Ultimately, however, the Court cautioned 
against applying all criminal procedures to juvenile court proceed-
ings, explaining that “[i]f the formalities of the criminal adjudicative 
process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there 
is little need for its separate existence.  Perhaps that ultimate disillu-
sionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined 
to give impetus to it.”197 
In United States v. Torres,198 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit applied the precedent established in 
Mckiever, concluding that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial 
even where prosecuted under the FJDA.199  Torres, a sixteen year old, 
was charged with creating an unauthorized photographic negative of 
a One Dollar Bill.200  On appeal, Torres argued that sections 5031 
through 5037 of the FJDA violated the right to trial by jury under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.201  Torres argued 
that the Act was unconstitutional because it forced a juvenile to make 
the choice between being tried as a juvenile and waiving the right to a 
jury trial, or being tried as an adult with the right to a jury trial.202  
Nevertheless, relying on McKeiver, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
FJDA as constitutional, observing in part that a juvenile proceeding 
 
193 Id. at 547. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 McKiever, 403 U.S. at 547. 
197 Id. at 551. 
198 500 F.2d 944 (1974). 
199 Torres, 500 F.2d at 949. 
200 Id. at 945. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 946. 
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does not fall within the scope of the criminal prosecution proceedings 
that are protected by the Sixth Amendment.203  In its reasoning, the 
court reiterated the principals of Mckiever, recognizing the need for 
the progress of juvenile courts as well as the FJDA’s commendable 
objectives to rehabilitate and “protect the wayward youth from stig-
ma and other consequences of a criminal conviction.”204  In fact, ar-
ticulating that affording the right to trial by jury to children could 
possibly deter from the Act’s commendable objectives, the Second 
Circuit explained: 
[T]he Juvenile court system providing intimate, in-
formal, protective and paternalistic procedure for the 
juvenile accused of wrongdoing, with rehabilitation 
rather than punishment as its goal, still ha[s] promise. 
To impose on that system trial by jury as a matter of 
right would be a regressive and undesirable step.  It 
would undermine the Juvenile Court’s ability to carry 
out its praiseworthy functions and goals and “would 
tend once again to place the juvenile squarely in the 
routine of the criminal process.”205 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals extended McKiever, upheld the 
FJDA, and concluded that the Sixth Amendment did not, for the pur-
poses of jury trial, extend to juvenile proceedings in federal court.206 
D.   Juvenile Culpability and Punishment 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,207 a fifteen year old convicted of 
first-degree murder was sentenced to death.208  Determining that it 
was cruel and unusual to sentence anyone under the age of sixteen to 
death, the United States Supreme Court reversed the sentence be-
cause it violated the Eighth Amendment.209  The Court considered the 
fact that all states allowed for juvenile court jurisdiction over juve-
niles up to sixteen years of age, and cited several consistent legal lim-
 
203 Id. at 949. 
204 Torres, 500 F.2d at 948. 
205 Id. at 947 (quoting McKiever, 403 U.S. at 547). 
206 Id. at 948. 
207 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
208 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818, 819. 
209 Id. at 838. 
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its that divided children and adults.210  Further, the Court acknowl-
edged “that the normal fifteen year old is just not prepared to assume 
the full responsibilities of an adult.”211  In reaching its decision, the 
Court also recognized that under the Constitution “punishment should 
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defend-
ant.”212  The Court described youth as “a time and condition of life” 
resulting in minors possessing a lessened capacity for perspective and 
good judgment.213  Thus, despite youths’ ability to cause irreparable 
harm, the Court acknowledged that younger people, “have less capac-
ity to control their conduct” and conceive of long-term consequenc-
es.214 
Most adults, having been teenagers before, understand the 
seemingly obvious, yet, important character differences between 
children and adults that the Court in Thompson emphasized and used 
to justify juveniles’ limited capacity for criminal responsibility.  
However, in what almost seems like an excuse for inexcusable indi-
vidual behavior, the Court unloaded the culpability of youths onto 
society as a whole.215  The Court reasoned that criminal acts by juve-
niles “represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, 
which share responsibility for the development of America’s 
youth.”216 
Approximately fifteen years following Thompson, a divided 
Court raised similar Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment issues re-
garding the death penalty and juveniles in Roper v. Simmons.217  Up-
on careful consideration for the concerns in this context, the Court 
raised the constitutional age limit of capital punishment from sixteen 
to eighteen years old.218  This time, the Court likened the condition of 
adolescence to that of mental retardation because of their shared abil-
 
210 Id. at 824-25 (pointing to legal lines drawn between children and adults because a cer-
tain level of responsibility is needed to participate in regulated activities, such as voting, 
gambling, serving on a jury, marrying without parental consent, and purchasing alcohol and 
tobacco products). 
211 Id. at 825. 
212 Id. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
213 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
214 Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.11) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
215 Id. 
216 Id.  
217 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
218 Id. at 575. 
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ity to lessen legal standards of criminal culpability.219  Notably, the 
Court recognized the arbitrariness of setting the age at eighteen and 
further explained why juveniles should not be considered as culpable 
as adults.220  First, juveniles lack maturity which can lead to reckless 
behavior and ill-considered actions.221  Second, “juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures 
including peer pressure,”222 and therefore, have less ability to “extri-
cate themselves from . . . criminogenic setting[s].”223  Third, as op-
posed to adults, juveniles have yet to fully develop a fixed charac-
ter.224  Consequently, there is a general belief that juveniles may still 
be reformed, despite committing a heinous crime.225 
More recently, in Graham v. Florida,226 the Court expanded 
the application of the Roper and Thompson concepts of juveniles’ re-
habilitative nature.227  In Graham, the Court concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment protects juveniles, convicted of all crimes except 
murder, from being sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”).228  
Given the age of a juvenile, life spent in prison is much longer on av-
erage compared to that of an adult, and therefore, cruel and unusu-
al.229  In its decision, the Court outlined why sentencing a juvenile to 
LWOP, other than with a conviction of homicide, lacks sufficient 
penological justification.230  First, retribution does not justify LWOP 
because juveniles are no longer considered as culpable as adults and 
LWOP is the highest punishment a juvenile can constitutionally re-
ceive.231  Second, LWOP is not justified as a deterrent for juvenile 
 
219 Id. at 563 (“Mental retardation . . . diminishes personal culpability even if the offender 
can distinguish right from wrong.” (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002))). 
220 Id. at 574 (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes 
between childhood and adulthood.  It is . . . the age at which the line for death eligibility 
ought to rest.”). 
221 Id. at 569. 
222 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115). 
223 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
224 Id. 543 U.S. at 570. 
225 Id. (observing “[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it 
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evi-
dence of irretrievably depraved character”). 
226 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
227 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-30, 2038. 
228 Id. at 2034. 
229 Id. at 2028. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. (stating that “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must 
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender” (quoting Tison v. Ari-
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crime because “[juveniles] are less likely to take a possible punish-
ment into consideration when making decisions,” especially when the 
punishment is rare.232  Third, although recognized as a prevention of 
recidivism, as well as a promotion of public safety, incapacitation of 
juveniles for life categorically denies their previously recognized 
malleable, rehabilitative nature.233  Lastly, LWOP does not justify the 
goal of rehabilitation through imprisonment because 
[t]he penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal.  By denying the defendant the right to reenter 
the community, the State makes an irrevocable judg-
ment about that person’s value and place in society.  
This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and lim-
ited moral culpability.234 
Most recently, the Court in Miller v. Alabama235 again recog-
nized the condition of youth as a limitation on culpability.236  In Mil-
ler, two fourteen year old defendants from different states were 
granted certiorari and challenged their respective state’s mandatory 
LWOP sentences.237  Both teenagers were tried as adults and convict-
ed of murder.238  Reiterating the justifications set forth by the Court 
in both Roper and Graham, the Court confirmed “what ‘any parent 
knows’ ” and what social and scientific studies have demonstrated—
that juveniles are less blameworthy because they are reckless and im-
pulsive, have an increased vulnerability to their environment, and are 
inherently less fixed in character than the average adult.239  Thus, the 
Court in Miller concluded that imposing a mandatory sentence of 
LWOP on juveniles as a less culpable class is violative of the Eighth 
 
zona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
232 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29. 
233 See id. at 2029; see also Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 
1968) (declaring a belief “that incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth [and] it is impossible 
to make a judgment that a fourteen year old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigi-
ble for the rest of his life”). 
234 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-30 (reasoning that LWOP defendants are not provided 
with vocational or other services that are rehabilitative in nature, to which juveniles are the 
most receptive). 
235 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
236 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-64. 
237 Id. at 2460. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 2464 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
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Amendment because no matter the crime, the severity of the penalty 
will always be disproportionate.240 
Although Miller and Jackson were both fourteen years old 
and had similar convictions, sentences, and upbringings,241 each teen-
ager’s level of involvement in his respective crime was diametric.242  
Jackson, from Arkansas, was charged in 1999 with capital felony 
murder and aggravated robbery, and sentenced to LWOP.243  The 
Court noted that it was questionable whether Jackson played an ac-
tive role in the robbery, or simply became caught up in circumstances 
beyond his control.244  While Jackson walked to the video store with 
two other boys, he learned that one boy had a shot-gun under his 
coat.245  Upon arrival at the store, Jackson waited outside while the 
other boys entered.246  Jackson then entered the store and witnessed 
the boy with the shotgun demanding money from the clerk.247  The 
parties at trial disputed whether Jackson “told his friends, ‘I thought 
you all was playing’ ”  or warned the clerk by stating, “[W]e ain’t 
playin.” 248 
Unfortunately for Jackson, under Arkansas law prosecutors 
are given discretion to charge juveniles as adults for certain violent 
crimes, and this particular prosecutor exercised that discretion.249  Be-
fore his conviction, Jackson made a motion to transfer his case to ju-
venile court.250  However, the Court denied Jackson’s motion in light 
of Jackson’s arrest history for shoplifting and car theft, the results of 
a psychiatric examination, and the “alleged facts of [Jackson’s] 
crime.”251 
Miller, from Alabama, grew up with a drug-addict mother, 
and attempted suicide at age six.252  One evening in 2003, Miller 
smoked marihuana and played drinking games with his friend, Smith, 
 
240 Id. at 2469. 
241 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
242 Id. at 2468-69. 
243 Id. at 2461. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
252 Id. at 2462. 
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and Miller’s mother’s drug dealer, Cannon.253  Later, when Cannon 
passed out, Miller stole his wallet.254  Upon catching Miller, Cannon 
grabbed Miller.255  Then, Miller seized a baseball bat and beat Can-
non continuously.256  Before Miller delivered the last blow to inca-
pacitate Cannon, he put a sheet over Cannon’s face and said, “I am 
God, I’ve come to take your life.”257  Then, along with Smith, Miller 
attempted to cover up the evidence by starting a fire.258  Cannon ulti-
mately died from the injuries caused by the bat and smoke inhala-
tion.259 
Alabama juvenile law differs slightly from Arkansas law.260  
Arkansas law gave deference to the prosecution to charge Jackson as 
an adult subject to the juvenile’s petition for a transfer to juvenile 
court,261 whereas Alabama law required that Miller automatically be 
adjudicated as a juvenile.262  Furthermore, in Alabama, when certain 
crimes are alleged to have occurred, the District Attorney may seek a 
removal from juvenile court to criminal court.263  In light of Miller’s 
apparent “mental maturity” and prior juvenile offenses of truancy and 
criminal mischief, as well as the violent “nature of the [alleged] 
crime,” the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the remov-
al.264 
In overturning both Miller and Jackson’s sentences, and con-
cluding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme 
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile 
offenders,” the Court expanded the precedent set by Roper and Gra-
ham, heavily relying on scientific studies.265  The Court did make 
clear, however, that in Miller it was “not categorically barr[ing] a 
 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
262 Id. at 2462. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 2463. 
265 Id. at 2469; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (stating that previous scientific “find-
ings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both 
lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and 
neurological development occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed”). 
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penalty for a class of offender’s . . . [i]nstead, [the Court’s ruling] 
mandate[d] only that a sentence follow a certain process—
considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before 
imposing a particular penalty.”266 
III.  JUVENILE TREATMENT IN NEW YORK STATE 
Federal precedent regarding juveniles reveals how science 
and statistics have influenced the United States Supreme Court deci-
sional law, especially when the science confirms our own common 
intuition.267  Over the past fifty years courts have gone from one ex-
treme to another in the treatment of juveniles.  Before Gault, a young 
child could be detained without due process because he made a lewd 
phone call.268  On the other side of the spectrum, presently, children 
are definitively recognized as less culpable and the law has come to 
their aid by giving them, in some ways, more rights than adults.269  
Over the years, similar policy concerns that have influenced the fed-
eral courts have also influenced New York State in its process and 
procedure used to adjudicate juveniles.  Specifically, in light of Mil-
ler, the New York State Legislature has sought to raise the age of 
culpability by either providing the family court with automatic juris-
diction over juvenile delinquency proceedings for sixteen and seven-
teen year old, non-violent offenders, or by creating special “youth di-
visions” for their prosecution.270 
A.  Evolution of Family Courts and Current 
Designations Under the Family Court Act 
In conjunction with the Penal Law, Article 3 of the Family 
Court Act regulates juvenile delinquency proceedings and disposi-
tions.271  The New York State Family Court Act (“Family Court 
 
266 Id. at 2471. 
267 See generally Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (relying on statistics of recidivism to question the mer-
its of a separate juvenile court system); Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (citing several scientific psy-
chological and brain science studies relied on in Roper and Graham). 
268 See generally Gault, 387 U.S. 1. 
269 See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
270 See S.B. 7394, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012) available at 
http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S7394-2011; S.B. 7020, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. 
(N.Y. 2012) available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S7020-2011. 
271 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 3 (McKinney 2012). 
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Act”) was enacted in 1962.272  Almost a century and a half prior to its 
enactment, various programs in New York State were developed to 
handle youths in a more rehabilitative fashion, and therefore, differ-
ently than their adult counterparts.273  One of the first efforts to sepa-
rate juvenile offenders from adult criminals included the creation of 
the New York House of Refuge, which was authorized to receive ju-
veniles upon their judicial commitment.274  Several decades later, the 
New York State Legislature enacted the “Disorderly Child” Act.275  
That Act defined disorderly children as people “under the age of six-
teen . . . deserting their homes without good and sufficient cause, or 
keeping company with dissolute or vicious persons against the lawful 
command of their [parent] . . . or other persons standing in the place 
of a parent.”276  As the nineteenth century came to a close, state child 
welfare agencies surged in urban New York areas, identifying a 
greater need for specialized courts to handle familial issues, including 
child prosecutions.277  Thus, branches of criminal courts, called Chil-
dren’s Courts Parts, began to spring up in in Manhattan and the 
Bronx.278  By the 1920s, the Children’s Court Act authorized the cre-
ation of similar courts in other counties across New York State to 
specifically handle cases dealing with juvenile delinquency and child 
neglect.279  Eventually, in 1962, the Family Court Act created a uni-
form court system, granting jurisdiction to family courts to handle 
cases involving “every symptom of familial dysfunction,” including, 
but not limited to child neglect, juvenile delinquency, intra-family vi-
olence, and paternity suits.280  The Act “establish[ed] procedures in 
accordance with due process of law,” seeking to balance “the needs 
and best interests of [juveniles with] the need for protection of the 
 
272 Merril Sobie, No Longer A ‘Judicial Stepchild’, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202574588751&slreturn=20130
308234848. 
273 Rose M. Charles & Jennifer V. Zuccarelli, Note, Serving No “Purpose”: The Double-
Edged Sword of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL 
COMMENTARY 721, 726-27 (1997) (providing an in depth history of juvenile treatment in the 
court system in New York). 
274 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 111 (McKinney 2012). 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Sobie, supra note 274. 
280 Id. 
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community.”281 
Under the Family Court Act, if it is proven that a person un-
der sixteen committed an act, which if committed by an adult would 
be considered a non-violent crime, he or she is automatically adjudi-
cated as a juvenile delinquent and afforded certain protections within 
the Family Court system.282  These protections include a lack of man-
datory sentences, an option of complete disposition of a case upon 
probation, or a sealed record.283 
Currently in New York State, a juvenile is defined as a person 
between the ages of seven and under the age of sixteen and over 
whom the family court has jurisdiction.284  Unlike in the criminal jus-
tice system in which adults are tried, the family courts hold fact-
finding hearings instead of trials and dispositional hearings instead of 
sentencing hearings.285  Furthermore, instead of a determination of 
guilt or innocence, a juvenile is adjudged a juvenile delinquent and 
put under supervision, treatment, or confinement by the court.286 
Youths in New York, ages sixteen and up to nineteen years 
old, are considered as criminally culpable as adults as demonstrated 
by their automatic arraignment and adjudication in criminal court.287  
However, depending on consideration of certain pertinent factors 
such as a lack of prior convictions or arrests, a positive reputation in 
the community, and a demonstrated respect for the law and society,288 
upon petition, those young defendants may be adjudged a youthful 
offender.289  Consequently, a youthful offender receives a more leni-
ent sentence, and the possibility of a sealed record, regardless of the 
crime.290 
 
281 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2012). 
282 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 375.1 (McKinney 2010).  
283 Id. (stating that if the juvenile proceeding is terminated in favor of the juvenile, all rec-
ords relating to the prosecution, arrest, and probation will be sealed). 
284 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney 2010).  
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287
 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10 (McKinney 2012). 
288 People v. Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 333-34 (3d Dep’t 1985) (stating that “fac-
tors to be considered include the gravity of the crime, mitigating circumstances, prior crimi-
nal record, prior acts of violence . . . level of cooperation with authorities, defendant’s atti-
tude toward society and respect for the law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for 
a future constructive life”). 
289 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20 (McKinney 2012). 
290 William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.02 (McKinney 
2012). 
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B.  Juvenile Offender Status 
Originally, the Family Court Act authorized jurisdiction over 
all children, fifteen years of age and younger, who had been charged 
with an adult equivalent crime.291  However, in 1978, the passage of 
the Juvenile Offender Act (“JOA”) removed family court jurisdiction 
over thirteen through fifteen year olds, charged with certain violent 
crimes, labeled them “juvenile offenders,” and subjected them to 
prosecution and sentencing under the Penal Law as adults.292 
The JOA was a knee-jerk legislative response to an infamous 
case involving a fifteen year old defendant, Willie Bosket.293  Bosket 
was adjudicated in family court, because of his youthful status, and 
was sentenced to only five years in prison for committing a double-
homicide.294  Inferring that some children were beyond repair, and 
thus, deserving of adult-like punishment for adult crimes, the JOA 
carved out certain exceptions to the prosecution of juveniles under 
the age of sixteen.295  These enumerated exceptions, or designated 
felony acts, are the most violent, malicious acts, such as, murder, 
rape, sexual abuse, arson, kidnapping, and robbery in the first de-
gree.296  As a result, in “a reversal of 150 years of American legal his-
tory,” the JOA allowed for child violent offenders, otherwise catego-
rized as juveniles, to suffer the consequences of criminal 
prosecution.297 
A little over a decade after the JOA became law, the Court of 
Appeals of New York decided People v. Roe.298  The facts before the 
Court and resolution of the case in Roe illustrate the unintended con-
sequences resulting from a law enacted in the wake of fear and con-
 
291 Sobie, supra note 274. 
292 Id. 
293 See People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 620 (N.Y. 1989); see also, Travis Johnson, All 
Children Are Created Equal Too: The Disparate Treatment of Youth Rights in America, 15 
CUNY L. REV. 173, 182 (2011) (providing some insight into Willie Bosket’s upbringing and 
treatment within the courts); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Ex-
treme Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 668 (2002) (explaining the political climate encompassing Willie 
Bosket’s case including the fact that Governor Hugh Carey signed the JOA into law two 
days following Bosket’s sentencing). 
294 Tanenhause & Drizin, supra note 293, at 668. 
295 Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 620. 
296 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney 2010). 
297 Johnson, supra note 293. 
298 542 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1989). 
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troversy.299  Just six months short of his sixteenth birthday, Steven 
Roe was convicted of second degree murder, specifically depraved 
indifference murder under Penal Law Section 125.25 (2).300  One idle 
summer afternoon, Roe and two of his friends decided to play a game 
of “Polish Roulette” with a 12-gauge shotgun.301  Roe incorrectly be-
lieved the first two chambers in his gun held “dummy” ammunition, 
where in fact they held live ammunition.302  Consequently, Roe acci-
dently shot and killed his best friend’s thirteen year old brother.303  
Thus, a senseless game amongst adolescent young boys quickly mor-
phed into an irreversible murder.304 
On appeal, the only issue in Roe was whether there was suffi-
cient evidence to establish Roe’s guilt for depraved indifference mur-
der.305  Upholding Roe’s conviction, the court explained the mens rea 
analysis of depraved indifference, as being “an objective assessment 
of the degree of risk presented by defendant’s reckless conduct.”306  
Instead of assessing the facts as revealing an impressionable, young 
defendant, unfamiliar with guns, the court characterized Roe as a cal-
culated criminal who should have known better than to participate in 
“a macabre game of chance where the victim’s fate—life or death—
may be decreed by the flip of a coin or a roll of a die.”307  More nota-
bly, the court reasoned that the conviction fit the crime, despite the 
boys young age, and immediate remorse, opining that “[t]he sheer 
enormity of the act—putting another’s life at such grave peril in this 
fashion—is not diminished because the sponsor of the game is a 
youth of 15.”308 
In an ardent dissent, Judge Bellacosa criticized the JOA and 
its effect as categorizing an obviously remorseful, yet reckless juve-
nile with cold-blooded, intentional, premeditated killers.309  Judge 
Bellacosa explained: 
 
299 Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 620 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
300 Id. at 610 (majority opinion). 
301 Id. at 616-17 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
302 Id. at 610 (majority opinion). 
303 Id. at 616 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
304 Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 616.  
305 Id. at 610-11 (majority opinion). 
306 Id. at 611 (quoting People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983), overruled by 
People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
307 Id. at 614. 
308 Id. 
309 Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 615 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
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From common-law times to modern penal code days, 
the tragic incident at the heart of this case has quali-
fied as the paradigmatic manslaughter with reckless-
ness as the culpable mental state or mens rea.  Indeed, 
until recently, persons under 16 years of age in this 
State were legal infants incapable of being convicted 
of any crime as an adult, no less of the prime, most 
heinous crime punishable under our law—murder.  
This case represents an enormous penological regres-
sion by combining the juvenile offender exception 
with the depraved indifference homicide exception and 
giving birth to this routinized homogenous murder 
category.310 
In addition to criticizing the JOA as regressive, Judge Bellacosa cri-
tiqued the statutory scheme as improperly subjecting juveniles like 
Roe to “a kind of double bind—creating an opposite anomaly from 
that which precipitated the juvenile offender legislation—the escape 
of then-juvenile delinquent Willie Bosket from the clutches of the 
adult criminal law.”311  Additionally, in effect, Judge Bellacosa ech-
oed federal precedent, such as Thompson (decided only a few months 
prior) by positing that charging, trying, convicting, and punishing a 
fifteen year old so that he may “live the rest of his life with the scarlet 
condemnation of ‘depraved murderer’ ”312 distorted the principle of 
proportionality.313  Further, Judge Bellacosa concluded his dissent 
with a harsh reminder of the consequences of adjudicating juveniles 
as adults under the rigidity provided by statutes, explaining that “[i]n 
the eyes of the law all the slayers are now made alike, when the per-
petrators themselves know and our best instincts and intelligence tell 
us, too, that they are very different.  Justice is disfigured by the pun-
ishment of offenders so homogeneously and, yet, so disproportionate-
ly.”314 
C.   Proposed Legislation 
Despite the criticisms of the JOA even soon after its enact-
 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 620. 
312 Id. at 617. 
313 Id. at 620.  
314 Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 620. 
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ment, it remains in effect today.  Moreover, New York State courts 
remain the only state courts that automatically adjudicate all youthful 
offenders in adult criminal court.315  Although taking variant ap-
proaches, every other state employs an effective transfer procedure 
for even the most violent youths that is used to evaluate whether the 
particular youth, the circumstances underlying the offense, and the 
nature and severity of the charges imposed, justify adjudication in 
criminal court.316  Furthermore, notwithstanding the nature of the of-
fense, New York State treats every sixteen year old juvenile alike, 
“adher[ing] to the early twentieth century age limitation” as a magical 
number to hold juveniles accountable for their criminal culpability, 
subjecting them to the same or similar punishment that would other-
wise be imposed upon an adult offender.317 
Despite the influential role that political standpoints tend to 
have on state legislatures, New York State remains tough on youths, 
arresting approximately 50,000 youths between sixteen and seventeen 
years old each year.318  Moreover, New York State and North Caroli-
na are the only states that presently recognize age sixteen as the ap-
propriate age to subject a juvenile to the jurisdiction of the criminal 
courts.319  However, in light of recent United States Supreme Court 
decisions, recognizing the significant differences that exist between 
the culpability of adult and juvenile offenders, the New York State 
Legislature has proposed new policies that would raise the age of 
culpability to seventeen years old, thereby providing either the family 
court or a specialized youth court with jurisdiction over certain pro-
ceedings for sixteen and seventeen year olds.320 
In early January of 2012, two bills concerning the appropriate 
age for criminal culpability came before the New York State Sen-
ate.321  One bill, better known as the Assembly Leadership Bill, if 
passed, would effectively increase the maximum age of family court 
jurisdiction over juveniles from fifteen years old to seventeen years 
 
315 Merril Sobie, Raising the Age: New York’s Archaic Age of Criminal Responsibility, 
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 4, 2012, at 4. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. 
318 N.Y.S.B. 7394 (2012).  
319 Sobie, supra note 315; see also The Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy, 
Schuyler Center Source, Raise the Juvenile Jurisdictional Age: An Update, available at 
http://www.scaany.org/resources/documents/scs_issue12_raisetheage_update_000.pdf. 
320 See generally N.Y.S.B. 7394; N.Y.S.B. 7020. 
321 The Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy, supra note 319. 
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old and simultaneously raise the present age of criminal responsibil-
ity recognized under the corresponding Penal Law.322  Additionally, 
the bill would repeal the JOA—meaning that thirteen through fifteen 
year olds accused of violent crimes would have an automatic right to 
a hearing in family court in order for the court to carefully decide 
whether to transfer and prosecute the juvenile in criminal court.323  
Finally, the bill proposes that the maximum age at which a juvenile 
may be considered for youthful offender status be raised from eight-
een to nineteen.324 
The second bill, the Sentencing Commission Bill, which was 
proposed by Chief Judge Lippman, portrays a hybrid approach, spe-
cifically accounting for the logistics that will come into play if the 
New York State Legislature raises the age of criminal culpability so 
as to funnel sixteen and seventeen year old juveniles through the 
court system.325  This bill would create “youth parts” within the Su-
preme Court.326  In effect, these specialized parts, rather than family 
courts, would have jurisdiction over cases involving sixteen and sev-
enteen year old offenders.327  Among the benefits behind the estab-
lishment of the youth parts is that the judges that would preside in 
these courts would have specialized training in psychology, and thus, 
would be apt to decide these cases and evaluate appropriate punish-
ment in light of the behavioral and emotional changes that juveniles 
undergo in the course of their adolescence.328  The ultimate goal of 
this bill is to establish an appropriate forum that balances the existing 
family court rehabilitation-focused approach and the culpability-
focused approach underlying criminal court procedural law.329 
Although these bills propose a policy and procedure for juve-
nile adjudication in harmony with that employed in the vast majority 
of states, the potential enactment of the bills has stirred up a contro-
versial debate.  For instance, opponents of the bill have argued that 
the family court system is already overburdened, and thus, without 
adequate judicial resources to carry out the plans intended.330  Specif-
 
322 Sobie, supra note 315. 
323 Id. 
324 N.Y.S.B. 7020 (2012). 
325 Sobie, supra note 315. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 N.Y.S.B. 7394 (2012).  
329 Id.; Sobie, supra note 315. 
330 Sobie, supra note 315. 
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ically, budgetary concerns are real because the family court system 
currently has a $162 million budget,331 which is bound to balloon as a 
result of funneling an increased number of youths through its court-
rooms. 
Notwithstanding the result of these two bills, the roots of the 
Family Court Act should not be forgotten.  The Family Court Act 
revolutionized juvenile adjudication, extending important due process 
rights to all juveniles.332  Since the United States Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgment that courts may not deprive juveniles of their due 
process protection, the family court system further evolved so as to 
uphold additional procedural rights and dispose of cases in a manner 
that allows for rehabilitation—recognizing that children are just chil-
dren and should not be subjected to the same standard as mature and 
developed adults.333 
The passage of either of the pending bills would serve to rec-
ognize that “New York’s children, including those that commit 
youthful mistakes, are no different than their counterparts in the rest 
of the country.”334  All sixteen and seventeen year olds, deserve both 
equal protection under the law, and the same or substantially similar 
opportunities for rehabilitation, as their younger teenage counterparts.  
In support of the family court system in general, and succinctly stated 
by Chief Judge Lippman, “[w]e cannot afford to falter.  If we miss 
opportunities to give children the support they need to grow into pro-
ductive adults . . . then we will feel the social consequences for dec-
ades to come.”335 
III.  CONCLUSION 
If either bill is enacted in New York State, it is likely that 
courts will be less inclined to perform legal gymnastics simply to 
clear a teenager’s record, but rather, will defer to the family court’s 
findings.  Nevertheless, the facts and resolution of Jaquan illustrate 
that a fine line exists between providing youths with due process and 
rendering proper punishment.  In light of the recognition of the “ben-
efits” of a family court disposition over a criminal record, it seems as 
 
331 Chief Judge Lippman, Family Court 50 Years Later, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 24, 2012). 
332 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 48. 
333 Lippman, supra note 331. 
334 Sobie, supra note 315. 
335 Lippman, supra note 331. 
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though the First Department did young Jaquan a disservice when it 
ruled to suppress the gun and reverse the disposition.  Jaquan, like 
other impressionable, vulnerable, and reckless teenagers, got caught 
up as the delivery boy in an illegal business transaction.  We can only 
guess whether and what personal circumstances might have caused 
him to get involved in such a dangerous and destructive undertaking.  
However, neither personal circumstances nor Jaquan’s youthful status 
should negate the fact that he was caught red-handed with a gun in 
his backpack and nearly one-thousand dollars in cash in his pocket.  
It is more than plausible that this was not the first time that Jaquan 
had engaged in questionable activity, as he was street smart enough 
to refuse to give his last name to the police officers or carry any type 
of identification. 
Yet, notwithstanding his actions and culpability, the family 
court gave Jaquan a fifteen-month probation period, directing 
Jacquan to perform community service and attend school on a regular 
basis during this time.  Arguably, a probation officer might have had 
the capacity to see that Jaquan stay out of trouble and perhaps be re-
habilitated.  However, the First Department, in its ruling, absolved 
Jaquan of responsibility for carrying a handgun.  What lessons did 
Jaquan learn from his exposure to the court system?  Ultimately, 
without any mechanism for deterrence or rehabilitation, Jaquan may 
continue along his troubled path, leaving open the possibility that he 
will likely find himself back in court at a future date. 
The question remains unresolved—at what point does a 
youthful indiscretion rise to the level of an intentional criminal act?  
Presently, the answer turns mainly upon the age of the actor.  As a 
society, we are inclined to see the good in people and recognize, like 
Chief Judge Lippman, that children especially deserve second chanc-
es.  Nevertheless, the legislature and courts must strike the balance 
between their recognition of the inchoate nature of juveniles and their 
responsibility to protect the citizenry. 
Ashley A. Hughes
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